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A key issue raised by previous researchers is the extent to which learning versus market structure 
is responsible for the high efficiency regularly observed for the double auction in human-subject 
experiments. In this study, a computational discrete double auction with discriminatory pricing is 
tested regarding the importance of learning agents for ensuring market efficiency. Agents use a 
Roth-Erev reinforcement learning algorithm to determine their bid and ask prices. The 
experimental design focuses on two treatment factors:  market capacity; and a key Roth￿Erev 
learning parameter that controls that degree of agent experimentation. For each capacity setting, it 
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I. Introduction 
 
In the last decade, agent-based computational economics (ACE) modeling has gained attention as 
another way to understand socioeconomic phenomena.  A growing number of research articles, 
books, and conferences are now applying this method to social science problems. General 
information about this method can now easily be found on the Internet. Among these, 
www.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm and www.jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk are good places to start. 
   2
One of the advantages of ACE modeling to be stressed in this study is the capability of imitating 
the behavior of real agents under hypothetical market conditions. This becomes especially 
important for problems that are too complicated to be analyzed by using an analytical approach.  
In ACE models, the effects of proposed structural changes for different market types can be 
evaluated and analyzed before they are applied to a real market condition.  For example, given the 
proposed restructuring of a market,  an ACE model could be used to investigate and apply several 
competing proposed market protocols  without disturbing or interrupting the current market 
operation.  
 
Several researchers have taken advantage of the ACE method to study several different protocols 
for restructuring in an electricity market. Bower and Bunn [1], for example, evaluate the market 
efficiency of two different proposed auction pricing mechanisms for the England and Wales 
electricity market: a uniform-price auction; and a discriminatory-price auction.  In their agent 
modeling, they use na￿ve reinforcement learning. Other researchers, Nicolaisen et al. [8] [9], 
report experimental market power and efficiency outcomes under systematically varied 
concentration and capacity conditions. They test two different learning algorithms in the context 
of a discriminatory-price double auction.   In their earlier paper [8], they test a genetic algorithm 
(GA) learning algorithm that enabled traders to engage in social mimicry. In their following 
research [9], they apply individual reinforcement learning by using a modified Roth-Erev  (MRE) 
learning algorithm.    
 
Gode and Sunder [4] have pointed out that the effect of market structure should be given special 
consideration in economic modeling.  Precisely, they stress the importance of separating the 
effect of learning agents from the effect of market structure.  In their research, under a continuous 
double auction protocol, the learning capability of agents is not a substantial factor for the 
determination of high efficiency outcomes. They observed that even zero-intelligence agents   
with a binding budget constraint could consistently result in high market efficiency.  In other   3
words, market structure has a more dominant role than agent learning in determining market 
efficiency for the continuous double auction.  
 
As one of the main objectives of this study, the Gode and Sunder argument will be studied   for 
our market framework.   Although Nicolaisen et al. [9] are aware of this issue, they do not try 
directly to test this issue in their research.   The framework used in this study is similar to the 
framework used in Nicolaisen et al.[8][9], which is a discrete double auction with price 
discrimination. However, the original Roth-Erev learning algorithm is applied instead of the 
modified version.   
 
A special feature of the Roth-Erev learning algorithm is that it tries to mimic the learning 
behavior of real humans. The algorithm incorporates basic principles of human learning behavior 
well-known in the psychology literature, such as the law of effect and the power of practice. In 
their studies, Roth and Erev calibrate the learning parameters for their algorithm against results 
obtained in experiments with human subjects. In the calibration process, they obtain a "best fit" 
set of learning parameters that best mimics human learning behavior observed in a wide range of 
games. 
 
The experimental design of this study focuses on two treatment factors:  market capacity; and a 
key Roth-Erev learning parameter e that controls the degree of agent experimentation. Learning 
parameter e has a nonnegative value.  As e greater than zero agent will not quickly become 
locked in to a particular strategy. Three different specifications for market capacity are tested. For 
each of these three market structures, eight different specifications are tested for the 
experimentation parameter e.  Two of the learning parameter specifications represent special 
circumstances:  a no-learning case; and a   "best fit " learning case.   Efficiency and market power 
outcomes are reported for each treatment in order to separate the effects of learning from the 
effects of market structure in the tested market framework.    4
 
To implement this study, a Java-based object-oriented general double auction simulator (DASim) 
is developed.  DASim constructs adaptive artificial agents to represent real traders.  Agents are 
capable of strategizing their ask and bid prices and quantities as they have the ability to learn via 
the Roth-Erev algorithm.  DASim also incorporates a general matching mechanism that acts as a 
clearing-house. It accepts traders’ asks and bids, matches these asks and bids to determine market-
clearing prices and quantities, and then announces to each trader his resulting price and quantity. 
  
The DASim is applied to the study of a restructured electricity market.   Agents in the auction are 
sellers and buyers of electricity. Sellers represent generation companies that generate electricity 
with a certain capacity.   Buyers represent distribution companies that purchase electricity to be 
redistributed to meet a certain level of retail demand.   The sellers and buyers repeatedly submit 
asks and bids to the clearing-house in an attempt to maximize their profits.  
 
The main contribution of this study is to show that, for a discrete double auction with price 
discrimination, learning has a substantial role in determining the efficiency of market outcomes.  
Specifically, as the experimentation parameter e in the Roth-Erev learning algorithm increases, 
market efficiency decreases monotonically. Moreover, systematic effects are also observed for 
other market outcomes such as agent market powers and obtained profits. At the same time it is 
observed that the incidence of coordination failure increases. These findings indicate that changes 
in the key experimentation parameter e for the well-known Roth-Erev reinforcement-learning 
algorithm can result in systematic changes in market outcomes for the discrete double auction, in 
contrast to the Gode and Sunder finding for the continuous double auction. 
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II.  Double Auction Simulator (DASim) Frame Work 
DASim is mainly supported by five different classes, which are DASim class, Agent class, 
Matching class, RandomGen class,  and Stats class. Each of these classes has a particular 














Figure 1 DASim Class Structure 
 
 
The basic attributes, methods and function of each class are as follows: 
1. DASim class.  
DASim is the main class of this program; therefore it controls the overall activity of the 
program.  This class decides the sequence of what agents should do, which agent￿s 
information should be passed to other classes, and decides which data results will be 
presented.  Basically it controls the traffic of information and the sequence of actions that 





        
 
 




























Simulation Flows   6
2. Agent class. 
It creates objects that represent sellers and buyers.  Each object will symbolize a trader with 
all of its unique attributes such as marginal cost (MC) or marginal revenue (MR) values and 
individual learning parameters.  These artificial traders are equipped with a learning 
capability to mimic the ability of agents to strategize ask and bid prices in the auction in order 
to maximize their own profits.  Other routine capabilities of these agents are initializing their 
strategy sets, submitting ask or bid prices, and calculating profits. 
3. Matching class. 
Matching class is constructed by several methods that represent the behavior of the 
clearinghouse. It accepts ask and bid prices from sellers and buyers, and processes them to 
determine the auction winner.  The detailed process for determining the auction involves 
some steps.  This class provides the necessary means for implementing all of those steps 
which are sorting the ask and bid, matching the highest bid and the lowest ask, determining 
the auction price, deciding the auction winner and, finally, sending I information back to the 
relevant traders. 
4. RandomGen class. 
RandomGen class is a pseudo random number generator. It generates random numbers that 
are needed in this simulator. In this class, we have the ability to control the seed for 
generating random numbers. As a result we can control a particular random number sequence 
that we want to generate. The idea of this seed control is to ensure the repeatability of the 
experimentation.  One of the main benefits of using Java platform is that the random number 
generated is independent of the platform and machines.  In this framework, the only type of 
pseudo random number available is a uniform random number generator. It could easily be 
expanded to other types if needed. 
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5. Stats class. 
Basically this class provides statistical calculations for the experimentation outcomes. 
Specifically, it calculates the average and variance of the experimentation results. Again, it 
could easily be expanded to another statistical measure if needed. 
 
The general sequence and interaction among the classes are shown in Figure 2. Mainly it can be 
explain in four steps.  First is the initialization step.  After all input setup parameters are received, 
the Agent class creates objects which represent sellers and buyers. Second is the bidding step.  
Buyers and sellers submit asks and bids. Asks and bids are selected from pre-defined sets of 
actions in accordance with choice probabilities. Agents use a reinforcement learning algorithm to 














Figure 2. DASim Flow Diagram 
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Third is the matching step. The clearing house successively matches the lowest ask price and the 
highest bid price to determine the matched buyer-seller pairs, sets the price for each matched 
buyer-seller pair at the midpoint of their bid and ask prices, and communicates this price back to 
each matched buyer-seller pair. Fourth, given the auction results, each trader calculates his   
profits and uses this profit calculation to update his choice probabilities for selecting a bid or ask 
price in the next auction round.  
 
As shown in figure 2, the second, third and fourth steps are done repeatedly depending on how 
many runs and how many auction rounds per runs  the experimenter  decides  to conduct for each 
experimental treatment. Note that, as shown in figure 2, after initialization steps these steps (step 
2,3, and 4) are also conducted once under competitive equilibrium conditions.  These conditions 
require each seller to set his ask price at the level of his true marginal cost and each buyer to set 
his bid price at the level of his true marginal revenue. he outcomes that result under these 
competitive conditions will later  be used as  benchmarks against which  the auction outcomes 
will be compared.  
 
III. Electricity Market Framework 
 
The electricity market framework used in this study is adapted from Nicolaisen et al.  [8],[9].  
There are a small numbers of agents that represent several sellers and buyers that submit asks and 
bids repeatedly to maximize their profits. Sellers have multi-unit capacities and different marginal 
costs. Similarly, buyers have multi-unit demands and different marginal revenues. A matching 
mechanism run by an independent clearinghouse accepts and matches the ask and bid prices. 
Once ask and bid prices are matched, the clearinghouse determines a price and quantity for each 
matched pair and sends these outcomes back to the traders.  The traders continuously update their 
ask and bid prices in each period based on the obtained profit in each period. 
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There are some important technical assumptions used in this auction framework.  
1.  In each auction round, each seller submits to the clearinghouse an ask price together with 
its maximum capacity. 
2.  In each auction round, each buyer submits to the clearinghouse a bid price together with 
its maximum demand level. 
3.  Traders’ budget constraints are binding.  A buyer always submits a bid price lower than 
or equal to his reservation price, i.e., his true MR.. On the other hand, a seller always 
submits an ask price higher than or equal to his reservation price, i.e., his true MC. 
4.   There are no binding transmission constraints. Traders can sell or buy as much capacity 
as they own or they need.  
5.  Contracts are binding.  All traders are obliged to carry out the trades determined by the 
auction results.    
6.  Information is imperfect and private. All information available in this framework is 
private information. A trader does not have any direct knowledge of the prices and 
quantities characterizing the trades of other auction participants.  
7.  No second market is available. A seller always acts only as a seller, and a buyer always 
acts only as a buyer.  Reselling is prohibited.  
 
A detailed illustration of how this market works is shown in Figure 2.  First, each trader selects an 
ask or bid price from a fixed interval of feasible price offers using a choice probability 
distribution initially specified to be a uniform distribution.  The clearinghouse receives these bid 
and ask prices, sorts the bid prices from the highest to the lowest, and sorts the ask prices from 
the lowest to the highest.   Once sorting is done, the matching process follows.  The highest bid 
price is matched to the lowest ask price, and the price set for this matching is the midpoint   
between the ask and bid prices. The next highest bid price is then matched to the next lowest ask 
price and so on until all remaining bid prices are below all remaining ask prices.  The 
clearinghouse then stops the matching process.   This price resolving mechanism is called price   10
discrimination. Unlike the uniform price which determining a single price for all the traders, price 
discrimination determines a separate price for each matched bid and ask price; namely, the mid-
point of the two.   
 
To make all these things more clear, we give an example with hypothetical ask and bid prices. 
Suppose sellers and buyers submit ask and bid prices as shown in Table I. 
Sellers  Ask Price   Quantities  
1 36  40 
2 18  40 
3 14  40 
Buyers  Bid Price   Quantities  
1 27  10 
2 15  10 
3 14  10 
4 28  10 
5 16  10 
6 14  10 
 
Table I.  Hypothetical Ask and Bid Prices during an Auction under Market Structure 1 
 
The clearinghouse then will conduct the sorting and matching process as shown in the following 
table. 
 SELLERS    Matched    BUYERS   
Sellers  Quantities  Ask Price  Auction Price  Bid Price  Quantities  Buyers 
3  10 14  21  28 10  4 
3  10 14  20  26 10  1 
3  10 14  15  16 10  2 
3  10 14  14.5 15 10  5 
2  40  18  Not Match  14  10  3 
1  40  36  Not Match  14  10  6 
 
Table II.  Sorting and Matching Mechanism by Clearinghouse under Hypothetical Ask and Bid Price 
 
Note that, based on private information assumption, the information as shown in Table II will be 
transferred privately to each trader.  Each trader applies its learning capability, and updates its 
choice probability distribution based on this information.   
 
   11
 
Sellers  Auction Price   Quantities  
1 0  0 
2 0  0 
3 21  10 
3 20  10 
3 15  10 
3 14.5  10 
Buyers  Auction Price   Quantities  
1 20  10 
2 15  10 
3 0  0 
4 21  10 
5 14.5  10 
6 0  0 
 












Figure 3.  Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand under Hypothetical Ask and Bid Prices. 
 
IV.  Definitions for Market Power and Market Efficiency 
 
In this section we define several key measures that will be used to evaluate outcomes for the 
auction market, such as individual market power, aggregate market power, and market efficiency. 
We also clarify the difference between structural market power levels and experimental market 
power levels.  As we will explain later in this section, these measures are basically calculated 


























PCE   12
from the profits obtained by the traders.  Structural market power levels are obtained from the 
competitive equilibrium outcomes. In contrast, experimental market power levels are obtained 
from the auction operating under the price-discrimination pricing mechanism. Since it is 
important to understand how profits are calculated, this chapter begins with the explanation of the 
profit calculation under competitive equilibrium.  It then concludes by explaining the calculation 
of profits under the auction protocol. 
 
IV. A. Competitive equilibrium  profit calculation 
By definition in this market structure, a competitive equilibrium (CE) is obtained when traders 
believe that their quantity choices have no effect on the market price P.  Therefore, the price P is 
an exogenous parameter to their trades. The formal approach for deriving the competitive 
equilibrium is shown in Nicolaisen et al. [9]. Under the competitive equilibrium calculation, all 
sellers and buyers submit their real MC and MR levels as their asks and bids.  
 
A competitive equilibrium is when Q
-1
s(p) , the aggregate inverse supply function, is equal to     
Q
-1
D(p), the aggregate inverse demand function. As shown in Figure 4a, for example, under 
market structure 1, the competitive equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity are at the 
intersection point of Q
-1
D(p) and  Q
-1
s(p), which occurs  at QCE and PCE.  Note that it is possible 
that the equilibrium price is not unique. In figure 4a, the equilibrium price could be anything in 




D(p) . For 
concreteness, if an interval of possible equilibrium prices exists, we will take the competitive 
equilibrium price to be the mid-point of the interval. This convention is the same convention that 
is   used in determining auction prices.  As a result, market structure 1 has a competitive 
equilibrium price of PCE =(17+11)/2=14, and an equilibrium quantity of QCE = 40. The dashed 
thick line projects the competitive equilibrium point to the price and quantity axes. 
   13
Following the calculation of the competitive equilibrium, the competitive profit for a seller i  in 
market structure j can be calculated by 
Π SCEi = (PCE - MCij) * QSCEij              ( 1 )  
where  
i     = 1,2,3    respectively refers to seller 1, seller 2, and seller 3. 
j    = 1,2,3  respectively refers to market structure 1, 2, and 3 
Π SCEij    = Competitive equilibrium profits for seller i at market structure j  
MCij     = Marginal Cost for seller i at market structure j 












Figure 4a.  Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand Under Actual MC and Actual MR in Market Structure 1 
 
Total seller profit under competitive equilibrium in market structure j is denoted by Π TSCEj 
which is the summation of all profits obtained by all of the sellers.  
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(2) 
Meanwhile, buyer k’s profit in  market  structure j can be calculated by : 
Π BCEj = (MRkj - PCE) * QBCEkj                   
 (3) 
where 
k     = 1,2,3,4,5,6  which respectively refers to buyer 1 to buyer 6 
j    = 1,2,3  respectively refers to market structure 1, 2, and 3 
Π BCEkj   = Competitive equilibrium profits for buyer k at market structure j  
MRkj     = Marginal Revenue for buyer k at market structure j 
QBCEkj   = Competitive equilibrium quantity obtained by buyer k at market structure j 
 
Total buyer profit under competitive equilibrium in market structure j is denoted by Π TBCE, 
which is the summation of all profits obtained by all of the buyers.  
 
(4) 
 Any traders that actually trade in the competitive equilibrium are called infra marginal (IM) 
traders.  As seen in Figure 4a, in market structure 1 the IM traders are seller 3, buyer 1, buyer 2, 
buyer 4 and buyer 5.  In contrast, any trader that fails to trade in the competitive equilibrium is 
called an extra marginal (EM) trader. As seen in Figure 4a, in market structure 1 the EM traders 
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To complete the illustration, using relations analogous to equations (1) and (3), the competitive 
equilibrium profit of each individual trader is calculated as follows (note that PCE1 = $14/MwH ) 
 
Trader’s ID  Notation  Status  Profit 
Seller 1  Π SCE11  EM 0 
Seller 2  Π SCE21  EM 0 
Seller 3  Π SCE31  IM   (14 - 11)*40 = 120 
Buyer 1  Π BCE11  IM   (37 - 14)*10 = 230 
Buyer 2  Π BCE21  IM   (17 - 14)*10 = 30 
Buyer 3  Π BCE31  EM 0 
Buyer 4  Π BCE41  IM   (37 - 14)*10 = 230 
Buyer 5  Π BCE51  IM   (17 - 14)*10 = 30 
Buyer 6  Π BCE61  EM 0 
 
Table IV a. Individual Competitive Equilibrium Profit Calculation in Market Structure 1, 
IM = Infra-marginal trader, EM = Extra-marginal trader. 
 
The aggregate total competitive equilibrium profits for buyers and sellers in market structure 1 
are therefore as follows : 
 
Π TSCE1    = Π SCE11 + Π SCE21  + Π SCE31      = 0 + 0 + 120 = 120 
Π TBCE1  = Π BCE11+Π BCE21 +Π BCE31+Π BCE41 + Π BCE51+Π BCE61  
=  230 + 30 + 0 + 230 + 30 + 0 = 520 
 
Following these same steps and referring to Figures 4b and 4c, the competitive equilibrium prices 
and quantities  for market structures 2 and 3, respectively, are PCE2 = $16.5 /MwH, QCE2= 40 
MwH, and PCE3= $26.5 /MwH, QCE3= 20 MwH.  The detailed calculation of the individual 
traders’ competitive equilibrium profits for market structures 2 and 3 are shown in the following 
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  Market   Structure 2    Market  Structure 3   
Trader￿s 
ID 
Notation Status Profit  Trader￿s 
ID 
Notation Status Profit 
Seller 1  Π SCE12  EM 0  Seller  1  Π SCE13  EM 0 
Seller 2  Π SCE22  IM  (16.5 - 16)*20 = 10  Seller 2  Π SCE23  IM   (26.5 - 16)*10 = 105 
Seller 3  Π SCE32  IM   (16.5 - 11)*20 = 110  Seller 3  Π SCE33  IM   (26.5 - 11)*10 = 155 
Buyer 1  Π BCE12  IM   (37 - 16.5)*10 = 205  Buyer 1  Π BCE13  IM   (37 - 26.5)*10 = 105 
Buyer 2  Π BCE22  IM   (17 - 16.5)*10 = 5  Buyer 2  Π BCE23  EM 0 
Buyer 3  Π BCE32  EM 0  Buyer  3  Π BCE33  EM 0 
Buyer 4  Π BCE42  IM   (37 - 16.5)*10 = 205  Buyer 4  Π BCE43  IM   (37 - 26.5)*10 = 105 
Buyer 5  Π BCE52  IM   (17 - 16.5)*10 = 5  Buyer 5  Π BCE53  EM 0 
Buyer 6  Π BCE62  EM 0  Buyer  6  Π BCE63  EM 0 
 
Table IV b. Individual Competitive Equilibrium Profit Calculations  
for Market Structures 2 and 3,  IM = Infra-marginal trader, EM = Extra-marginal trader. 
  
The aggregate total competitive equilibrium profits for buyers and sellers in market structures 2 
and 3 are as follows: 
Π TSCE2    = Π SCE12 + Π SCE22  + Π SCE32    =  0 +  10 + 110  = 120 
Π TBCE2    =Π BCE12+Π BCE22 +Π BCE32+Π BCE42 + Π BCE52+Π BCE62  
=  205 + 5 + 0 + 205 + 5 + 0 = 420 
Π TSCE3   = Π SCE13 + Π SCE23  + Π SCE33   = 0 + 105 + 155 = 260 
Π TBCE3   =Π BCE13+Π BCE23 +Π BCE33+Π BCE43 + Π BCE53+Π BCE63   







































































Figure 4c.  Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand under Actual MC and actual MR in Market Structure 3 
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IV. B. Auction profit calculation 
There are two main differences between profit calculations for the competitive equilibrium and 
profit calculations for the auction. First, unlike in the competitive conditions, in the auction the 
sellers and buyers will likely submit ask and bid prices that are different from their true MC and 
MR levels. Intuitively, in order to obtain higher profits, a seller will ask higher than its MC, and a 
buyer will bid lower than its MR. Second, the auction uses a discriminatory pricing mechanism 
instead of a uniform pricing mechanism as used for the competitive equilibrium. As a result, the 
auction might result in a different  price for each matched seller-buyer pair. 
  
Recall that the technique to determine the auction’s equilibrium prices was explained in section 
III and illustrated in Figure 3.  In that section, it is assumed that under market structure 1 sellers 
and buyers submit hypothetical ask and bid prices as shown in Table 1.  After a matching process 
carried out by the clearinghouse, as shown in Table  2, the auction results are as reported  in 
Table 3.   Referring to Figure 3, the dashed thin lines show the auction prices for the respective 
matched traders.  These lines are at the midpoint of the ask and bid prices submitted by the 
matched seller-buyer pairs.   
 
Formally, the auction profit for an individual trader  i in  market structure j is given by  
           
(5) 
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for buyers, where 
i     = 1,2,3   respectively refers to seller 1, seller 2, and seller 3. 
j    = 1,2,3   respectively refers to market structure 1, 2, and 3 
k     = 1,2,3,4,5,6 respectively refers to buyer 1 through  buyer 6 
Π SAij     = Auction  profit for seller i  under  market structure j  
MCij     = Marginal cost for seller i under  market structure j 
PA(Bk, Si)j   = Price discrimination price between seller i and buyer k under market structure j 
QASi(Bk)j  = Quantity matched between seller i and buyer k under market structure j 
Π BAkj     = Auction  profit for buyer k under  market structure j  
MRkj     = Marginal revenue for buyer k under  market structure j 
QABk(Si)j  = Quantity matched between buyer k and seller i under market structure j 
 
By construction, QASi(Bk)j  =   QABk(Si)j .  
Note that the values of  PA(Bk, Si)j  , QASi(Bk)j  and   QABk(Si)j are decided by the clearinghouse 
matching mechanism. 
By using the above notation, Table 3 formally can be reported as follows : 
Sellers Auction  Price  Quantities 
1  PA(., S1)1=0 QSA1(.)=0 
2  PA(., S21=0 QSA2(.)=0 
3  PA(B4,S3)1=21 QSA3(B4)=10 
3  PA(B1S3)1=20 QSA3(B4)=10 
3  PA(B5S3)1=15 QSA3(B4)=10 
3  PA(B2S3)1=14.5 QSA3(B4)=10 
Buyers Auction  Price  Quantities 
1  PA(B1S3)1=20 QBA1(B4)=10 
2  PA(B2S3)1=14.5 QBA2(B4)=10 
3  PA(B5, .)1=0 QBA3(B4)=0 
4  PA(B4S3)1=21 QBA4(B4)=10 
5  PA(B5S3)1=15 QBA5(B4)=10 
6  PA(B6, .)1=0 QBA6(B4)=0 
 
Table V.  Table III Presentation by Using Notation in Equations (5) and (6), 
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By applying  equations (5) and (6) , individual profits from the  auction are as follows : 
Traders ID  Notion  Profit 
Seller 1  Π SA11  0 
Seller 2  Π SA21  0 
Seller 3  Π SA31  (21-11)x10 + (20-11)x10 + (15-11)x10 + (14.5 -10)x10 = 265 
Buyer 1  Π BA11  (37 - 20 )*10 = 170 
Buyer 2  Π BA21  (17 - 14.5)*10 = 25 
Buyer 3  Π BA31  0 
Buyer 4  Π BA41  (37 - 21)*10 = 160 
Buyer 5  Π BA51  (17 - 15)*10 = 20 
Buyer 6  Π BA61  0 
  
Table VI.  Individual Auction Profit Calculations for the Hypothetical Ask and Bid Prices  




The total seller and buyer auction profits under market structure j are respectively denoted by 





Under the hypothetical asks and bids scenario under market structure 1, as shown in table VI, the 
aggregate profits for seller and buyers are: 
Π TSA1 = Π SA11 + Π SA21 + Π SA31  = 0 + 0 + 265  = 265 
Π TBA1 = Π BA11 + Π BA21  + Π BA31  + Π BA41 + Π BA51 + Π BA61   
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One special case of the calculation of auction profits is when all sellers and buyers ask and bid 
their actual MC and MR levels. In this case, we can refer to Figure 4a to 4c, for market structure 
1, 2 and 3. The dashed thin lines show the auction discriminatory prices for the variously matched 
traders. As shown in Table VII, asterisk signs (*) mark the individual auction profit calculations 
for this special case 
 
Trader’s  Market  Structure 1  Market Structure 2  Market  Structure 3 
ID Notation  Profit  Notation  Profit Notation Profit 
Seller 1  Π SA*11  0 - EM  Π SA*12  0 - EM  Π SA*13  0 - EM 
Seller 2  Π SA*21  0 - EM  Π SA*22  10  Π SA*23  105 
Seller 3  PSA*31  320  PSA*32  260  PSA*33  130 
Total   Π TSA*1  320  Π TSA*2  270  Π TSA*3  235 
Buyer 1  Π BA*11  130  Π BA*12  130  Π BA*13  130 
Buyer 2  Π BA*21  30  Π BA*22  5  Π BA*23  0 - EM 
Buyer 3  Π BA*31  0 - EM  Π BA*32  0 - EM  Π BA*33  0 - EM 
Buyer 4  Π BA*41  130  Π BA*42  130  Π BA*43  105 
Buyer 5  Π BA*51  30  Π BA*52  5  Π BA*53  0 - EM 
Buyer 6  Π BA*61  0 - EM  Π BA*62  0 - EM  Π BA*63  0 - EM 
Total  ΠΠΠΠ TBA*1  320  ΠΠΠΠ TBA*2  270  ΠΠΠΠ TBA*3  235 
 
Table VII. Individual and Aggregate Auction Profit Calculations when Sellers and Buyers  
Submit their Actual MC and MR Levels. EM denotes an extra-marginal trader 
 
IV. C. Market Power 
Mas-Collel , Winston, and Green, [8] defines market power as "the ability to alter profitably 
prices away from competitive levels". In this auction framework, traders could alter their profits 
away from the competitive levels by submitting asks and bids different than their actual MC or 
MR levels. Individual, aggregate, and structural market power levels will next be defined.  
 
IV. C.1. Auction Market Power 















Aggregate buyers market power under market structure j is defined as : 
(11) 




   IV. C2. Structural Market Power 
Structural market power is a special case of auction market power, when all sellers 
and buyers ask and bid their true MC and MR levels.   The expression for structural 
market power has the same basic form as the expression for as auction market power.  
Hereafter, an asterisk will be used to distinguish a structural market power calculation 
from a regular auction market power calculation.  






































The structural market power for seller i under market structure j is defined as : 
(14) 
 
Aggregate buyers structural market power under market structure j is defined as: 
 
 (15) 
Aggregate sellers structural market power under market structure j is defined as : 
(16) 
 
IV. D. Efficiency 
The efficiency of market j operating under the auction protocol is defined to be total auction 




V. Roth- Erev Learning Algorithm 
 
This learning algorithm is characterized by three main parameters: a scaling parameter s(1);  a 
recency parameter r; and an experimentation parameter e.  In the initial auction round, each 
trader assigns an equal "propensity value" to each of his feasible actions (price offers).  The trader 











































then updates these propensity values at the end of every subsequent auction round based on the 
profits he obtains during this auction round.   
 
More precisely, at the beginning of the first auction round, the propensity value that a trader j 
assigns to a feasible action k is given by  the following equation :  
 
qjk(1) = s(1) X/K ; 
(18) 
where      
qjk(n)  : trader j’s  propensity value for  action at the beginning of auction round n;  
s(1)  : scaling parameter;  
K   : total number of feasible  actions for each trader;    
X  : average trader profits in any given auction round (a scaling measurement).  
 
As shown above, at the beginning of the initial auction round, each feasible action for each trader 
has an equal propensity value. Once propensity values are obtained, the probability with which 
agent j chooses action k is calculated as follows: 
(19) 
Since the initial propensities are all assigned equal values, equation (19) ensures that the initial 
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The propensity updating mechanism is explained as follows. Suppose that, in the n
th auction 
round,  trader  j chooses action k'  and receives  a profit R(j,k',n)  For the  next auction round,  the 




qjk(n)  : the propensity assigned by trader j to  action k at the beginning of auction round n  
r  : recency parameter 
e  : experimentation parameter 
E(• ) :  update  function 
 
The recency parameter r  reduces the importance of past experience, since  r has a value between 
zero and one. The update function E(.) is shown as follow: 
 
(21) 
The selected action k' is assigned a reward or penalty consisting of the  profit  R(j,k',n) multiplied 
by the factor   (1- e).  The unselected action also obtains a reward or penalty based on the profit 
obtained by the chosen action. However, this reward or penalty consists of the profit multiplied 
by e/(K-1), hence it differs from the reward or penalty for the selected action. 
 
Finally, the updated propensity values will change each trader’s choice probability distribution for 
determining the selection of an action for the next auction round. This learning process takes 
place in each auction round, for the entire 1000 auction rounds each constituting one run of the 
auction. Ideally, this updating mechanism should result in the convergence of the choice 
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probability distributions of the traders to some ultimate distributions that are sharply peaked at 
"best" actions for the traders. 
 
VI.  Experimental Design 
 
The experimental design focuses on two treatment factors:  market capacity; and the key Roth￿
Erev experimentation parameter e that controls that degree of agent experimentation.  The market 
structures used in this research are adapted from Nicolaisen et al. [8],[9]. The changes in market 
capacity will cause a shift in structural market power advantages. As shown in the upper-left 
corners of Tables VIII-X,  structural market power advantages shift from the sellers to the buyers 




1 2 3 
Seller's 
Capacity 
40 20 10 
Buyer's 
Capacity 
10 10 10 
 
Table VIII. Three Different Market Structures 
 
 
For each market structure, 8 different values for the experimentation parameter e are tested, 
ranging from  e = 0 to e = 1.  Specifically, these values are as follows: {1.0, (K-1)/K, 0.8, 0.5, 0.3, 
0.2, 0.1, 0.0). K is the number of feasible actions for each   trader. In this study, K = 30. Two of 
the e values represent special cases of human behavior. The first case (NL) is when the traders 
have  no learning capability.  The second case ("Best Fit") is when e represents the ￿best fit￿ to 
human behavior as determined by Roth and Erev [2].  The no-learning situation NL happens 
when e = (K-1)/K, and the  ￿best fit￿ situation is when e = 0.2.  The derivation of no-learning 
situation will be explained in discussion section. 
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In this study, the trader’s MC and MR values and their strategy domains are also adapted from 
Nicolaisen et al.[9].  The values of MC or MR for individual traders are shown in Table IX. Note 
that there are three different values for both MC and MR. These values represent three different 
types of operating cost: expensive, average, and cheap. Each seller has a feasible action (price 
offer) set that consists of 30 feasible actions (K = 30) spaced uniformly over the interval  [MC, 
MC + $40/MwH].  Since each action is equally spaced, the difference from one action to the next 
is    $1.33/MwH. Similarly, each buyer has a feasible action (price offer) set that consists of 30 
feasible actions spaced uniformly over the  interval  [MR-40, MR] if MR-40 > 0 , or  [0, MR] if 
MR-40 < 0.  The spacing between successive actions will then be   $1.33/MwH and   MR/30, 
respectively.  With these conditions, sellers will never submit an ask price lower than their MC, 
and buyers will never submit a bid price lower than zero or higher than their MR. In other words, 
all traders are restricted to ask and bid prices within their budget intervals. 
 












Table IX. Linear Revenue and Cost Curve. 
 
The values of the two parameters s(1) and r for the Roth-Erev reinforcement learning algorithm 
are set the same as in Nicolaisen [9 ] for their "best fit" case: namely,   s(1) = 9.00, r=0.10.   
 
A treatment therefore consists of a particular market structure 1, 2, or 3 together with a particular 
setting for the experimentation parameter e. For each treatment, 100 runs are generated using 100 
different seed values for the pseudo-random number generator. Each run consists of 1000 auction 
rounds. Finally at the end of each run  (i.e., at the end of the 1000
th round), data is collected and is   28
averaged across the 100 runs.  To have a better sense of outcome variability, the mean and 
standard deviation of outcomes across the 100 runs are presented.   
 
VII. Experimental Results 
 
Tables V ￿ VII report structural market power outcomes, individual and aggregate market power 
outcomes, and efficiency auction outcomes for three different market structures. For each market 
structure, 8 different values are tested for the experimentation parameter value e.   
 
All evaluated outcomes are recorded at the end of each auction round for each run. In this 
computational experiment, we generate 100 runs for each different treatment. Therefore, there 
will be 100 sets of evaluated outcomes for each treatment.  The mean values of outcomes across 
these 100 runs are taken to represent the evaluated outcomes for the treatment.  In addition to 
average values, standard deviations are also presented to give a clearer picture of the variability in 
the observations. An asterisk mark is given to a mean market power outcome if it is within one 
standard deviation of the structural market power outcome. 
 
As shown in Tables X - XII and Figures 3  - 12, as e decreases, all the evaluated outcomes such 
as market power levels and market efficiency increase.  At the same time, as shown in Table XI, 
the sources of inefficiency decrease. 
 
 Figures 5 - 7 contrast the individual ask and bid prices for the no-learning case NL with the ask 
and bid prices under learning with positive e values, for each run for the three different market 
structures.  It shows a significant difference between the observations. In all market structures, 
under no learning individual traders submit random asks and bids. In contrast, when individual 
traders have learning capability, they submit ask or bid prices in a much more stable range, with a   29
smaller variance. However, the bid and ask prices of some traders still have a relatively large 
variance.   
 
The price offers for Seller 3, Buyer 3 and Buyer 6 are not depicted because they are extra-
marginal traders that have  too high a marginal cost and too low a marginal revenue, respectively. 
As a result, they could not be matched in any market structure.   On the other hand, there is no 
guarantee that any infra-marginal traders will sell or buy something in the auction.   As shown in 
Table XIII, except in market structure 3 with e = 0, the event that an infra-marginal trader fails to 
trade always happens in all market structures and for every value of e.  Another important 
observation is also shown in Table XIII.  In every market structure, matching always happens 
when e = 0, that is, complete coordination failure is never observed.   
 
VIII Discussion   
 
A . Efficiency Market Power Outcomes 
 
From Tables VIII ￿ X and Figure 8, we can observe a systematic relation between the 
experimentation parameter e and efficiency outcomes. As e increases, the efficiency decreases 
monotonically.  This happens consistently for all tested market structures. Generally, as e 
increases from 0 to 1, the efficiency outcomes in the three market structures decreases from 94.3 
% to 23.1%, 93.2 % to 25%, and 100 % to 23.1 %, respectively. 
 
The reasons behind the decreasing efficiency are explained in Table XI and Figure 9, which show 
the frequency counts of the sources of inefficiencies for each treatment.  As e increases from zero 
to one, coordination failure (when all the agents fail to trade) increases form zero to about 50 
(half the number of runs).  Fifty percent of coordination failure alone will cause a 50 % decreases 
in the market efficiency outcomes.  Moreover, even if coordination failure does not happen,   30
inefficiency can still exist when any of the IM traders fails to trade and or any of the EM traders 
manages to trade.   
 
This observation is confirmed by looking at Figures 10 ￿12, which shows the profit earnings for 
each of the market structure2. Infra-marginal traders mostly show a decreasing profit trend as e 
increases. Meanwhile, in some market structures EM traders, could manage to trade. However, no 
significant trends are observed for the EM traders. 
 
The best efficiency outcomes for this computational experiment (at e = 0) are about the same as 
the ones found in the same market structure under the modified Roth-Erev (MRE) learning 
algorithm in Nicolaisen et al.[9].   Under MRE the efficiency observed under market structures 
1,2,and 3, respectively, in Nicolaisen  et al.[9] are 91.8 %, 94.2 % , and 100 %.. Similarly,  by 
using original Roth￿Erev  learning algorithm with e = 0, we obtain efficiency levels of  94.3 %, 
93.2 % and 100% respectively for market structures 1,2, and 3. 
 
 
B.  Market power  outcomes 
Nicolaisen et al.[9] tries to predict the market power outcomes in a similar auction framework by 
determining analytically derived structural market power level.  They found that there is a 
consistency between relative structural market power (SMP) and experimental relative market 
power (EMP) outcomes. Specifically, they found that if sellers attained higher market power in 
the auction than buyers when calculated in terms of structural market power, they also obtained 
higher market power in the experimental auction. 
 
 
Recall that structural market power measures the basic advantages or disadvantages offered to 
individual traders by the structure of a particular auction market. The artificial adaptive agents   31
then try to exploit their advantages, or offset their disadvantages, by strategically submitting bid 
and ask prices.  The traders with an   advantage will try to maintain or even enhance their 
advantage, while the traders with a disadvantage will try to offset or even eliminate it.  A positive 
SMP for traders of a particular type (sellers or buyers) means that these traders have an advantage 
under the auction protocol.  As observed in the auction outcomes, they lose some of this 
advantage in absolute terms because their EMP is less than their SMP. However, they maintain 
their relative advantage, because the sign of EMP is the same as the sign of SMP. On the other 
hand, a negative SMP for traders of a particular type means that these traders have a disadvantage 
under the auction protocol. These traders gain in absolute terms in the experimental auction 
because their EMP is higher than their SMP. However, they are not able to overcome their 
relative disadvantage, because the sign of EMP remain the same as the sign of SMP. The exact 
extent of the absolute gain and decline in SMP for traders of each type depends on the particular 
market structure.   In general, then, the learning capabilities of the traders permit them to reduce 
the absolute differences in their SMP but not their relative differences.  
 
C. Analysis of  the Roth-Erev learning Algorithm 
Tables X ￿ XII and Figures 8 - 17 show that there is a strong relation between the value of the 
experimentation parameter e and the experimental auction outcomes.  As e decreases, the "good" 
outcome measures such as market efficiency, individual and aggregate market power levels, and 
individual profits, show an increasing pattern. On the other hand, the "bad" outcome e measures 
such as coordination failure show a decreasing pattern.  The immediate question raised by these 
results is  whether the  outcomes under the  RE learning algorithm are  intended to be this highly 
sensitive to changes in  e or whether this is something that Roth and Erev did not  observe when 
they developed and tested this algorithm for different types of games ?  
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As mentioned earlier, RE learning algorithm is only one type of reinforcement learning 
algorithm. Under this type of learning algorithm any feasible action that has a good outcome will 
be rewarded by an increase in its relative  "weight" or  "strength".  
 
The strength   given to a particular action is related to how good the outcomes attained using this 
action have been.  In   other words, the strength of an action is proportional to the magnitude of 
its benefits. On the other hand, a chosen action that results in  "bad" outcomes will be penalized 
by having its strength reduced relative to other actions.  In the long run, as the learning process 
continues, the choice probability will be more tightly massed around the action that has resulted 
in the best outcomes (the "superior action").   It is expected that, after a sufficient period of 
learning, the probability distribution over feasible actions will be bell shaped and centred around 
the  superior action. If the learning process is "long enough" the choice probability may even 
converge to a single peak at the superior action.  This is the desirable long run outcome in any 
application making use of reinforcement learning.  
 
In this auction framework at hand, the convergence to a single action choice is not observed for 
almost all of the tested e parameter values. The only treatments that show convergence to a single 
action are those for which e = 0 . In all cases, bounded-convergence happens. . Under bounded-
convergence, the probability of choosing the superior action never converges to 1.  Rather, even 
at the very end of an experimental run, there is still a substantial positive probability that traders 
will choose actions other than their superior actions.  In this study, it is observed consistently that 
the choice probability of the superior action will converge to  (1 ￿ e).  Meanwhile, the other 
choices will maintain a positive probability level with no particular probability distribution.  In 
most cases the inferiors action are observed to have flat choice probabilities, with value of e/K-1. 
 
This bounded-convergence conjecture is consistent with what we observe in Table XIII. As e 
decreases, the choice probability distribution becomes more tightly centred around the superior   33
action, implying there is a smaller chance that traders will choose actions other than their superior 
actions. At e = 0 it is observed that the traders always choose their superior actions by the end of 
the auction.  This explains why coordination failure (all traders fail to trade) is not happened 
when e = 0.  
 
On the other hand, as e increases (note that every trader has the same value of e), the chance of 
choosing actions in the tails of the choice probability distribution increases.  Consequently, the 
chance that traders will choose actions other than their superior actions increases.  Under the 
worst-case scenario, each   trader could simultaneously choose an inferior action that is extremely 
different than his superior action. Under this condition, complete coordination failure could 
occur.  Table XIII shows that, as e increases, the chance that traders deviate from their superior 
actions increases.  In consequence, coordination failure occurs more often, and the chance of 
experiencing the worst-case scenario increases.   
 
What causes this bounded convergence to occur, with resulting losses in market efficiency ?  This 
question is analytically difficult to answer since it involves the strategic behavior of all of the  
traders.  However, intuitively, bounded convergence occurs because of the way in which the 
updating mechanism handles zero-profit events.  In this auction, a trader might obtain zero profit 
when submitting particular ask or bid price k' in some auction round n. In this case, however, 
equation (24) implies that the trader’s choice probabilities will remain unchanged for the next  
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Therefore, the propensity updating equations reduce to  
(23) 
for all k. 
 
This means that trader j's propensity values for auction round n+1 are equal to his current 
propensity values times the common scaling factor  (1-r). Thus the choice probability that trader j 
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This implies that, when any trader j obtains a zero profit outcome, his choice probability 
distribution is not updated in response to this outcome.   The only condition under which a 
trader’s choice probability distribution will be updated is when the trader obtains a positive profit 
outcome.  
 
As mentioned earlier, intuitively, the convergence of the traders’ choice probability distributions 
to a nice bell shape, peaked at "superior" actions, will only occur if good action choices are 
rewarded and bad action choices are penalized.   In the current auction framework, however, 
since traders use the RE learning algorithm, no penalties are imposed on actions leading to zero 
profits.    
 
The conclusion that can be obtained from these observations is as follows.  In any treatment in 
which  e takes on a positive value, the choice probability distributions will tend to assign a 
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( n q r n q jk jk − = +  35
persistently positive probability (bounded away from zero) to the collection of actions resulting in 
zero profits.  This will cause the traders to choose actions other than the superior actions, even in 
the "long run."   Therefore, only in treatments with e=0 should one expect to observe high market 
efficiency.  
 
D. The Importance of Learning in Discrete Double Auctions  
The objective of this section is to clarify the Gode and Sunder [1] conjecture about the 
importance of learning for market efficiency under a continuous double auction  (CDA) market 
structure. Gode and Sunder claim that structure of the CDA is primarily responsible for the high 
market efficiency they observe in their CDA experiments. They claim that high market efficiency 
is attained even with zero-intelligence agents as long as budget constraints are binding on these 
agents.  
 
To show the importance of learning in the current discrete-auction framework, a direct 
comparison of outcomes with learning and without learning is made. Under RE learning 
algorithm, the no-learning case can be obtained by setting the value of e such that the update 
function will equalize the impact between a selected action   k and any unselected action k’.   
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(26) 
where K = number of feasible  actions for any trader j. 
Thus, when   e = (K-1)/K , the traders lose their  learning capability.  However, as discussed in 
Section VI, budget constraints are always binding on the traders in the current auction framework, 
in the sense that the traders are not permitted to choose actions (price offers) that would definitely 
result in negative profits.   This resembles the binding budget constraint that Gode and Sunder 
impose on their zero-intelligence agents.    
 
The contrast in outcomes between learning (e = 0) and no learning  (e=[K-1]/K) can be observed 
in Tables X - XII.  These tables and figures show that, in moving from the no-learning case to the 
learning case, market efficiency for each of the three tested market structures increases by     
396%, 336 %, and 394 %, respectively.  Specifically, market efficiency improves from 0.238 to 
0.943 in market structure 1, from 0.277 to 0.932 in market structure 2, and from 0.24 to 1 in 
market structure 3. 
 
The contrast in outcomes between the no-learning case and the learning case are also clearly seen 
in Figure 5 ￿ 8.   When traders have no learning capability, the ask and bid prices of the traders in 
the final auction round display a random pattern across runs.  On the other hand, when the traders 
have a learning capability, the infra-marginal (IM) traders submit ask and bid prices that cluster 
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Therefore, we can conclude that in the discrete double auction (DDA) with discriminatory 
pricing, learning plays a very significant role.  This contrasts sharply with the finding of Gode 
and Sunder for their CDA market structure: namely, that market structure, not learning, is the 
primary determinant of market efficiency.  
 
IX. Concluding Remarks 
 
Several important and interesting points are raised by the findings reported in the current study.  
 
1.   For a discrete double auction with discriminatory pricing, the learning capability of 
the traders has substantial effects on market efficiency.  This finding is the opposite of 
what Gode and Sunder [4] found in their continuous double auction experiments. . 
 
2.  Although structural market power (SMP) is a good predictor of the relative market 
power levels attained by sellers and buyers in the experimental auction, as claimed in [9], 
learning nevertheless has important systematic effects on these experimental market 
power (EMP) levels in absolute terms.  The differences between SMP levels and EMP 
levels can be used to measure the importance of learning in the market. The more 
substantial the difference in SMP and EMP, the more important is the learning for 
obtaining high market efficiency outcomes. 
 
3.  Use by traders of the Roth-Erev reinforcement learning algorithm results in 
systematic errors in the context of the current auction framework unless the Roth-Erev 
experimentation parameter e is set to 0.  More precisely, it is observed that the traders’ 
selected actions result in ever greater efficiency losses as e increases. The reason is that 
the traders are not responsive to zero-profit outcomes when e takes on a positive value.   
This lack of responsiveness prevents the convergence of the traders’ choice probability   38
distributions to bell-shaped distributions sharply peaked at a "superior" action. In the 
present computational experiment, this type of convergence is only observed when e = 0. 
 
4.  Some potential future research areas that could extend this study are : 
a.  Find an analytical proof of the problem with the Roth-Erev learning 
algorithm that has been found in this study, and improve the algorithm if possible 
b.  The current computational experiment assumes that traders use the same   
learning algorithm with the same  parameter values. More interesting results 
might be found if the traders were instead permitted to use different learning 
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MARKET STRUCTURE NO LEARNING e = 1.0
MP MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers 1.667 All Sellers -0.365 0.742 All Sellers -0.373 0.752
All Buyers -0.385 All Buyers -0.853 0.197 All Buyers -0.86 0.192
Seller[1] N/A Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] N/A Seller[2] 0 0 Seller[2] 0 0
Seller[3] 1.667 Seller[3] -0.609 0.681 Seller[3] -0.608 0.688
Buyer[1] -0.435 Buyer[1] -0.816 0.281 Buyer[1] -0.831 0.272
Buyer[2] 0 Buyer[2] -0.972 0.200 Buyer[2] -0.972 0.207
Buyer[3] N/A Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] -0.435 Buyer[4] -0.857 0.249 Buyer[4] -0.859 0.247
Buyer[5] 0 Buyer[5] -0.983 0.164 Buyer[5] -0.982 0.176
Buyer[6] N/A Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.238 0.228 Efficiency 0.231 0.270
e= 0.8 e = 0.5 e = 0.3
MP Stdev MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers -0.278 0.746 All Sellers 0.077 0.682 All Sellers 0.317 0.618
All Buyers -0.798 0.219 All Buyers -0.616 0.247 All Buyers -0.43 0.219
Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] 0 0 Seller[2] 0 0 Seller[2] 0 0
Seller[3] -0.538 0.740 Seller[3] -0.192 0.823 Seller[3] 0.085 0.846
Buyer[1] -0.768 0.298 Buyer[1] -0.584 0.335 Buyer[1] -0.379 0.288
Buyer[2] -0.972 0.176 Buyer[2] -0.879 0.283 Buyer[2] -0.745 0.355
Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] -0.783 0.305 Buyer[4] -0.58 0.351 Buyer[4] -0.403 0.326
Buyer[5] -0.983 0.164 Buyer[5] -0.863 0.322 Buyer[5] -0.722 0.366
Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.299 0.292 Efficiency 0.514 0.302 Efficiency 0.71 0.261
e = 0.2 e = 0.1 e = 0.0
MP Stdev MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers 0.487 0.645 All Sellers 0.262 0.576 All Sellers 0.569 0.500
All Buyers -0.355 0.212 All Buyers -0.243 0.253 All Buyers -0.202 0.095
Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] 0 0 Seller[2] 0 0 Seller[2] 0 0
Seller[3] 0.326 0.846 Seller[3] 0.209 0.655 Seller[3] 0.46 0.709
Buyer[1] -0.327 0.265 Buyer[1] -0.208 0.288 Buyer[1] -0.185 0.100
Buyer[2] -0.594 0.349 Buyer[2] -0.48 0.392 Buyer[2] -0.288 0.438
Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] -0.319 0.276 Buyer[4] -0.212 0.281 Buyer[4] -0.191 0.095
Buyer[5] -0.602 0.377 Buyer[5] -0.508 0.395 Buyer[5] -0.323 0.453
Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.803 0.259 Efficiency 0.852 0.274 Efficiency 0.943 0.118
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MARKET STRUCTURE NO LEARNING e = 1.0
MP MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers 1.25 All Sellers -0.421 0.780 All Sellers -0.486 0.770
All Buyers -0.357 All Buyers -0.081 0.266 All Buyers -0.826 0.261
Seller[1] N/A Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] 0 Seller[2] 1.615 6 Seller[2] 1.327 6
Seller[3] 1.364 Seller[3] -0.606 0.789 Seller[3] -0.651 0.767
Buyer[1] -0.366 Buyer[1] -0.785 0.346 Buyer[1] -0.804 0.341
Buyer[2] 0 Buyer[2] -0.872 0.919 Buyer[2] -0.841 1.048
Buyer[3] N/A Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] -0.366 Buyer[4] -0.829 0.302 Buyer[4] -0.843 0.292
Buyer[5] 0 Buyer[5] -1 0.000 Buyer[5] -1 0.000
Buyer[6] N/A Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.277 0.345 Efficiency 0.25 0.341
e= 0.8 e = 0.5 e = 0.3
MP Stdev MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers -0.296 0.810 All Sellers -0.052 0.642 All Sellers 0.054 0.623
All Buyers -0.768 0.283 All Buyers -0.643 0.265 All Buyers -0.392 0.279
Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] 1.865 6 Seller[2] 3.561 6 Seller[2] 1.554 5
Seller[3] -0.493 0.864 Seller[3] -0.381 0.824 Seller[3] -0.083 0.812
Buyer[1] -0.752 0.352 Buyer[1] -0.633 0.362 Buyer[1] -0.393 0.367
Buyer[2] -0.747 1.374 Buyer[2] -0.704 1.175 Buyer[2] -0.516 1.060
Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] -0.779 0.316 Buyer[4] -0.63 0.351 Buyer[4] -0.38 0.381
Buyer[5] -0.95 0.501 Buyer[5] -0.793 0.778 Buyer[5] -0.769 0.562
Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.337 0.365 Efficiency 0.495 0.322 Efficiency 0.707 0.295
e = 0.2 e = 0.1 e = 0.0
MP Stdev MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers 0.27 0.404 All Sellers 0.092 0.359 All Sellers 0.222 0.362
All Buyers -0.306 0.224 All Buyers -0.128 0.182 All Buyers -0.151 0.084
Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] 0.548 4 Seller[2] 1.119 2 Seller[2] 2.872 4
Seller[3] 0.244 0.632 Seller[3] -0.001 0.417 Seller[3] -0.019 0.636
Buyer[1] -0.29 0.305 Buyer[1] -0.105 0.226 Buyer[1] -0.159 0.122
Buyer[2] -0.693 0.612 Buyer[2] -0.27 0.453 Buyer[2] -0.57 0.500
Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] -0.301 0.319 Buyer[4] -0.142 0.257 Buyer[4] -0.122 0.089
Buyer[5] -0.778 0.432 Buyer[5] -0.3 0.482 Buyer[5] -0.58 0.467
Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.822 0.232 Efficiency 0.921 0.170 Efficiency 0.932 0.095
Table XI. Structural Market Power, Auction Market Powers and Efficiency Outcomes 
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MARKET STRUCTURE NO LEARNING e = 1.0
MP MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers -0.096 All Sellers -0.78 0.274 All Sellers -0.787 0.279
All Buyers 0.119 All Buyers -0.735 0.335 All Buyers -0.747 0.336
Seller[1] 0 Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] 0 Seller[2] -0.773 0 Seller[2] -0.794 0
Seller[3] -0.161 Seller[3] -0.784 0.476 Seller[3] -0.782 0.399
Buyer[1] 0.095 Buyer[1] -0.78 0.476 Buyer[1] -0.776 0.494
Buyer[2] 0 Buyer[2] 0 0.000 Buyer[2] 0 0.000
Buyer[3] 0 Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] 0.143 Buyer[4] -0.695 0.537 Buyer[4] -0.723 0.528
Buyer[5] 0 Buyer[5] 0 0.000 Buyer[5] 0 0.000
Buyer[6] 0 Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.24 0.272 Efficiency 0.231 0.272
e= 0.8 e = 0.5 e = 0.3
MP Stdev MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers -0.707 0.277 All Sellers -0.506 0.321 All Sellers -0.355 0.290
All Buyers -0.654 0.330 All Buyers -0.434 0.379 All Buyers -0.269 0.355
Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] -0.742 0 Seller[2] -0.539 1 Seller[2] -0.375 1
Seller[3] -0.684 0.453 Seller[3] -0.484 0.483 Seller[3] -0.342 0.430
Buyer[1] -0.656 0.567 Buyer[1] -0.435 0.581 Buyer[1] -0.268 0.558
Buyer[2] 0 0.000 Buyer[2] 0 0.000 Buyer[2] 0 0.000
Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] -0.654 0.550 Buyer[4] -0.437 0.581 Buyer[4] -0.272 0.573
Buyer[5] 0 0.000 Buyer[5] 0 0.000 Buyer[5] 0 0.000
Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.317 0.268 Efficiency 0.526 0.316 Efficiency 0.683 0.247
e = 0.2 e = 0.1 e = 0.0
MP Stdev MP Stdev MP Stdev
All Sellers -0.318 0.277 All Sellers -0.2 0.263 All Sellers -0.062 0.182
All Buyers -0.178 0.369 All Buyers -0.135 0.272 All Buyers 0.077 0.224
Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0 Seller[1] 0 0
Seller[2] -0.325 0 Seller[2] -0.189 0 Seller[2] -0.05 0
Seller[3] -0.314 0.402 Seller[3] -0.208 0.341 Seller[3] -0.07 0.184
Buyer[1] -0.147 0.510 Buyer[1] -0.075 0.390 Buyer[1] 0.074 0.253
Buyer[2] 0 0.000 Buyer[2] 0 0.000 Buyer[2] 0 0.000
Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0 Buyer[3] 0 0
Buyer[4] -0.209 0.538 Buyer[4] -0.196 0.136 Buyer[4] 0.08 0.230
Buyer[5] 0 0.000 Buyer[5] 0 0.000 Buyer[5] 0 0.000
Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0 Buyer[6] 0 0
Efficiency 0.744 0.265 Efficiency 0.829 0.245 Efficiency 1 0.000
Table XII. Structural Market Power, Auction Market Powers and Efficiency Outcomes 
Under Different Values of Experimental Parameter e in Market Structure 3
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Market Structure 1
NL 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
IM fail to trade
Seller3 71 64 42 27 22 14 11
Buyer1 16 18 22 11 7 4 0
Buyer4 22 23 24 17 8 5 0
Buyer2 48 55 69 60 35 19 6
Buyer5 52 61 71 58 40 23 5
EM manage to trade
Seller2 21 26 30 28 20 12 16
S e l l e r 1 0000000
B u y e r 3 0100010
B u y e r 6 0000010
All agents  5 1 4 1 1 4 3460
Market Structure 2
NL 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
IM fail to trade
Seller3 73 63 50 35 16 6 8
Seller2 77 72 55 43 66 10 26
Buyer1 16 19 27 15 12 4 0
Buyer4 19 19 25 15 13 6 0
Buyer2 46 52 73 60 71 15 53
Buyer5 47 54 72 66 72 17 53
EM manage to trade
S e l l e r 1 0000000
B u y e r 3 0000000
B u y e r 6 0000000
All agents  5 4 4 6 2 0 8210
Market Structure 2
NL 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
IM fail to trade
Seller3 70 59 37 22 16 9 0
Seller2 77 68 44 34 20 17 0
Buyer1 26 30 22 24 16 9 0
Buyer4 21 25 28 25 24 15 0
EM manage to trade
S e l l e r 1 0110000
B u y e r 2 1121100
B u y e r 5 1001000
B u y e r 3 0000000
B u y e r 6 0000000
All agents  5 3 3 8 1 6 2110
Table XIII. Sources of Inefficency Frequency Counts









































































































Figure 5A. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 
No Learning vs Learning (e=0), for Market Structure 1, Seller2 and Seller 3 
 
 









































































































Figure 5B. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 
No Learning vs Learning (e=0), for Market Structure 1, Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 
 
 









































































































Buyer 5 NL Buyer 5 e= 0
 
 
Figure 5C. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 
No Learning vs Learning (e=0), for Market Structure 1, Buyer 3 and Buyer 4 
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Figure 6A. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 





















































































































Figure 6B. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 
No Learning vs Learning (e=0), for Market Structure 2,  Buyer 2 and Buyer 3  
 
 












































































































Buyer 5 NL Buyer 5 e= 0
 
 
Figure 6C. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 
No Learning vs Learning (e=0), for Market Structure 2, Buyer 4 and Buyer 5 











































































































Figure 7A. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 
No Learning vs Learning (e=0), for Market Structure 3, Seller 2 and Seller 3 






















































































































Figure 7B. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 
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Figure 7C. Comparison of Ask and Bid Prices Recorded at the 1000
th Auction Round 
No Learning vs Learning (e=0), for Market Structure 3, Buyer 4 and Buyer 5 
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Figure 8. Efficiency Vs Experimentation Parameter e for Different Market Structure 
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Figure 10. Average Total Profits Earn in Final Auction Run for Buyer and Seller in Market Structure 1 Vs 
Experimentation Parameter e 
CE = Calculated Profits Under Competitive equilibrium 
APD* : Calculated Profits Under Auction Protocol when Seller and Buyer Bids their Actual MR and MC 




















































































































































Figure 11. Average Total Profits Earn in Final Auction Run for Buyer and Seller in Market Structure 2 Vs 
Experimentation Parameter e 
CE = Calculated Profits Under Competitive equilibrium   56
APD* : Calculated Profits Under Auction Protocol when Seller and Buyer Bids their Actual MR and MC 














































































Figure 12. Average Total Profits Earn in Final Auction Run for Buyer and Seller in Market Structure 2  
Vs Experimentation Parameter e 
CE = Calculated Profits Under Competitive equilibrium 















































































Figure 13. Average Aggregate Profits Earned in Final Auction Run for Buyers and Sellers  
Vs Experimentation Parameter e 
CE = Calculated Profits Under Competitive equilibrium 
APD* : Calculated Profits Under Auction Protocol when Seller and Buyer Bids their Actual MR and MC   58
























































































Figure 14. Aggregate Structural market Power (SMP) and Aggregate Auction Market Power (AMP) 
For Buyers and Sellers Using Different Tested Values of The Experimentation Parameter e  
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Figure 15 A. Individual Structural Market Power (SMP*) and Individual Auction Market Power (AMP*)  
under Market Structure 1 
Using Different Tested Values of The Experimentation Parameter e for Seller 3 
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Figure 15 B. Individual Structural Market Power (SMP*) and Individual Auction Market Power (AMP*)  
under Market Structure 1 
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Figure 15 C. Individual Structural Market Power (SMP*) and Individual Auction Market Power (AMP*)  
under Market Structure 1 
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Figure 16 A. Individual Structural Market Power (SMP*) and Individual Auction Market Power (AMP*)  
under Market Structure 2 
Using Different Tested Values of The Experimentation Parameter e for Seller2 and Seller 3 
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Figure 16 B. Individual Structural Market Power (SMP*) and Individual Auction Market Power (AMP*)  
under Market Structure 2 
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Figure 16 C. Individual Structural Market Power (SMP*) and Individual Auction Market Power (AMP*)  
under Market Structure 2 
Using Different Tested Values of The Experimentation Parameter e for Buyer 4  and Buyer 5 
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Figure 17. Individual Structural Market Power (SMP*) and Individual Auction Market Power (AMP) 
Under Market Structure 3 Using Different Tested Values of The Experimentation Parameter e 
Note : Other Sellers and Buyers are Extra Marginal Agents 
 
 